I would like to begin by asking the reader to grant me two principles upon which I intend to make this argument. The first is that morality is accessible through reason and the second is that universal sane human intuitions can be trusted. It is my goal that if the two above principles are indeed true, then the below argument naturally follows.
If someone has been issued a speeding ticket, it is entirely possible that the interaction may end with him being shot. Afterall, if he resists arrest, flee, and attempt to combat the police than there is a fairly decent chance that he will be shot. By and large, no one will hold that this was a radical breach in morality on the part of the officer. Why? Because the reason that he was shot was not as a punishment for the speeding ticket. Afterall, if this were true, then the officer would be a murderer as death for a speeding ticket breaks the moral principle of measure for measure.
Rather, the shooting was due to the violation of another law—do not rebel. Rebellion is a capital crime in nearly every if not every moral system. Resistance to a legitimate authority can and should be punished even unto death. However, this ban on rebellion cannot be absolute. The important term here is legitimate authority. This is a negative statement that includes a positive statement, that is, rebellion against an illegitimate authority is morally permissible.
Now, let us say that one is living in Nazi Germany. If that person rebels against the Nazis by hiding Jews, or resisting other such barbaric laws, has that person committed the moral sin of rebellion? Everyone, except the Nazis, would be inclined to say that no, such a person is fully innocent. This is a demonstrative of the positive statement. As the Nazi regime was not a legitimate authority, rebellion against it is a moral right if not duty. While the above example of Nazi Germany is a clear demonstration of an illegitimate authority, the term as of right now remains undefined. Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to establish what is a legitimate authority.
Legitimate as defined by the dictionary means lawful, however in this case it does not mean the laws of the land. Indeed, this would render all state authority legitimate as the very definition of a state is supreme authority within its land. No one may thus dictate laws to a state for either they are the citizens of the state and subject to these laws or they are another state and thus cannot assert the superiority of their own equally arbitrary legal codes.
As such this definition would leave us without a right to rebel, and such a right is a necessity lest we contradict the above moral intuition. As such, the law that we are speaking of much be that of a universal ethical code. The existence of such a law, its proofs and objections, and the like are beyond the scope of this essay. I will ask the reader's forgiveness for including such a loaded and by no means proven assumption. The topic is complex and worthy of its own book, let alone article.
The conclusion is thus that we must determine what are the moral laws that govern a state before we can answer the question as to the definition of legitimate.
I would advance the following are the moral duties that a state must fulfill to be legitimate. Like any moral failings, there are shades of grey, however, the flagrant consistent violation of any of these duties means that the state has completely lost it's legitimacy where upon the right to rebellion may be invoked as will be elaborated on below.
These duties can be roughly divided into two sections that of internal duties, duties a state owes to its own people, and external duties, those a polity owes to other polities.
The internal duties are:
The external duties are:
It goes without saying that any polity that practices piracy, raiding, or slaving has likewise found themselves in violation of these duties. All of these can be summed up in one sentence, "A polity exists to replace chaos with order to promote prosperity."
In the beginning as Thomas Hobbes says, "Life was nasty brutish and short." This is a direct function of chaos as any two men may take the property, freedom, and life of any one man. A clever man may use guile to do likewise to two men, rendering even small cooperation a poor protection against being victimized. Thus, even the assemblage of a hundred men is not a total protection against one man victimizing them all. All men therefore cannot trust even one man without a knife to his throat to enforce trust.
According to Steven Pinker, based upon Keeley's Before Civilization and various other archeological studies, on average 15% of deaths in non-state societies are due to violence. This is direct archeological evidence for a continual war against all.
When two men are both holding the knife to each other's throat we return to the equality that Hobbes blames for the 'war against all'. This entails therefore that one man must be the only holder of the knife or alternatively that he holds many many more knives than his fellow man. Through this man or organization holding the knives they then gain a monopoly of power in a region and their word becomes law. While this can be abused, it is the only solution to the war against all. This organ on coercion is what we know as the state as Max Weber defines it. We should contrast the above statistic with another also from Steven Pinker which says 0.7% of all deaths in the twentieth century, despite two world wars, the holocaust and many other genocides, are from violence. This is an over fifteen fold decrease from the average state society to one of the most violent centuries after the development of the state. It should be noted that this is specifically looking at war deaths rather than homicide, as such this number could be even more disproportionate if taken into account.
Seeing therefore how the state is defined and why people permit another man to hold a knife to their throat, we may then ascertain its duties. When someone or something is given a duty, they likewise have commensurate privileges in order to accomplish their duties—meaning they are granted special moral dispensations for acts that would be grave violations for another. As an example, a teacher may confiscate the property of a student. This is not stealing for it is their privilege. A teacher has a duty to teach the student and therefore may execute actions, even those that would be moral crimes for another, to achieve this goal. However, the privilege, being derived from the duty, does not overstep it. As such a teacher that confiscates the shoes of a student arbitrarily has committed a moral violation despite his authority. This is even if the duties are still being discharged in an excellent fashion. Despite this, the teacher is a thief and ought to be reprimanded for the abuse. This is alluded to in the works of Thomas Aquinas who said, "An unjust law is no law". Why? Because the duty of Justice includes the privilege of law making and enforcing. However, this privilege does not overstep its source duty meaning that a law in violation of the duty of justice has no moral weight behind it and indeed the issuing authority has violated morality. Therefore, if one were to object but a tyranny that unjustly imposes order does fulfill the duties and roles of a state, they would be mistaken, as the privilege is only granted to fulfill the duty and the overreach of the privilege of coercion is the very definition of a tyrant.
As we saw above, the privilege of confiscation for the teacher is a direct derivation from the teacher's duty of education. Therefore, any privileges granted to a state is directly derived from its duties and thus is dependent upon them.
As the lack of coersion with in a society demonstrates, for as Perkie Avos says "...for without [the state] men would eat each other alive", coercion is necessary to establish just order from chaos. Thus the privilege of coercion is held by the state. Seeing as how anything besides exclusivity for this privilege would only invite the war against all, the exclusivity of the privilege of coercion may be derived thereby. Beyond an active pursuer, no one may go and execute their justice upon another man no matter how deserving that person is of said justice. Afterall, this would lead to a return to chaos as each man decides to execute vengeance upon real or imaginary wrongs. Humans are very good at rationalizing themselves as the victim and in extending the law of the pursuer far beyond its moral bounds, of which are beyond the scope of this essay. Thus the state must retain the exclusive knife or be remiss in its duties. The privilege of being able to wield the knife means that the state must zealously guard against others from claiming this privilege illegitimately. The state must keep its people safe from those that would seek to ignore the law and, having through insanity or rationalization permitting the forbidden, wielded the knife against their fellow citizens. To return to Max Weber's definition of a state, "[it] is considered the soul source of the 'right' to use violence." While Weber was descriptive, we can see that as the purpose of a state is to fulfill the duty of moral order, the "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" being necessary for the achievement of this goal, this definition is in fact prescriptive.
As such, we see the duty of justice is in the application of the privilege of the monopoly of violence towards moral ends. Laws must be congruous with morality rather than contrary to it. Likewise, there should not be any distinction made between men besides that which morality dictates. A state which arbitrarily divides its justice system or introduces laws which interfere with the moral duties and privileges of its people has overstepped its mandate and thus failed in its duty to produce justice. The arbitrary seizure of the life and property of a man within the war against all is the very reason that the state was established. If a state violates justice through arbitrary seizures then its existence is pointless and thus illegitimate.
Now, as the state is by its very nature an organization, it must be able to delegate its authority either to other organizations or to individuals. However, this raises the question of if a state could delegate its authority could it not share? Why could there not be multiple cooperating and co-equal holders. This is the argument of the neo-feudalist, actual neo-feudalists, and of voluntaryists. This, however, presents us with two issues.
First if we presume that their domains overlap, then we have bred chaos. For one house could be governed by many laws, where upon, a person may be forced to violate the laws of one polity to adhere to the other. This will eventually lead to war as is seen in history. When the King and nobility had overlapping authority, one or the other won. Either the nobility will make themselves supreme as they did in England or the King will crush his nobility underfoot as happened in France. Only a state of both sides being unable to overcome the other would temporarily permit this power sharing agreement, and any slightest tip in the balance would result in civil war, chaos, and destruction.
In the end, we would thus be left with a state that delegates authority, or alternatively, two polities that each have individual areas of responsibility and privilege each with supreme authority in this area.
This however is not sustainable, and the stronger will erase the weaker until it has shriveled away. Again England is an excellent example or see the repeated side lining of the Emperor by the Shogun. Parliament being stronger has erased the authority of the Crown rendering it a figure head as the Shogun did to the Emperor until the Emperor seized authority and destroyed the rival polity. Even with a power sharing agreement such that privileges do not overlap, one will encroach upon the other until there is a total monopoly.
However the second issue is that if we distribute knives then we have merely created smaller monopolies. The anarchist in essence creates a state of one where upon the war against all resurfaces. Expanding this, we can see that the smaller the polity the more common war is. Greece was more war torn when it was individual feuding city states than when Rome held a knife to their necks. The larger the polity holding the knife, for the most part the more peaceable. Africa under the Europeans saw the end of tribal warfare with Africa being much more peaceful under the Europeans. Those that object saying that Europeans subjected the natives to tyranny are correct and we agree in that privileges extend only as far as is necessary to fulfill the associated duties. One wonders what duty was fulfilled through hand quotas.
Thus we have either lost the benefits of the state or placed us on a harder road to the monopoly that we attempted to avoid. The consolidation of authority is thus both necessary and inevitable.
In order to execute the privilege of coercion, a state requires the above delegation of duties. Those that it delegates too will either need to further delegate or to dedicate their lives to the wielding of the delegated authority. As they are unable to work, they must therefore draw their sustenance from the state. Given that the state requires resources to support those to whom they have delegated authority, it is granted the privilege of enacting various fees and taxes in order to have these resources. As it is their privilege, one who avoids these taxes and fees is guilty of theft and rebellion. Meaning that tax avoidance is a moral crime.
The discharging of these duties in addition requires certain buildings and infrastructure which requires their own workers and maintenance. This is a second reason why this privilege is granted to the state.
However, a state does not exist in isolation. It is not just its own citizens that represent a threat to chaos, but also other polities. For, as stated above, the war against all does not stop when the organizations of people are scaled up, instead its frequency by and large diminishes. As such the state has a duty to prevent the prosecution of war against itself and in the event of war to take any and all actions to cease this threat. From here we can derive another privilege, that is, a state may even annihilate an entire city if and only if this is necessary for the rapid ending of the war. The astute reader will understand what exactly I am referring to. However, arbitrary destruction for the vague aim of 'punishment' or other goals incongruous and beyond the duty of security are moral crimes and can and should eliminate the legitimacy of a state.
Proportionality as a principle isn't where if your enemy attacks you with pies you must not escalate to cakes, but rather violence that goes beyond what is required for the execution of the duty of security is immoral. Likewise, if one polity is massing to attack presenting a real and current threat then a pre-emptive strike is indeed a moral necessity, for else, the state would be sacrificing the security of its citizens. Security is distinct from safety in
The final duty of stability is inherent within the word order. Order within society is brought by stability. As Hayek observed, “Spontaneous order is possible only within a framework of general rules which are enforced.” Thus unless the state is to organize every facet of every citizen's life, which is beyond ridiculous, it has a duty of enabling spontaneous order through stability along with establishing order where it will not spontaneously arise. A system which is constantly in flux, such as a cup being shaken, will never reach an equilibrium. It becomes the very definition of chaos. A state that changes the fundamental rules of society, such as the value of its money, at a rapid rate has created an unstable and therefore chaotic environment. Likewise the state may create institutions which minimize the chaos when spontaneous order proves itself unable to produce long term sustainable stability. At this point my libertarian readers will have a sinking feeling I am referring to the fed. They are correct.
However, the duties of a state does not just end with its borders. For above I made a clear distinction between having a state of war and not. A state was created for the expressed purpose of preventing the 'war against all'. As such, actions that threaten to ignite war should not be taken. These actions thus become moral duties for a state to neither prosecute in times of peace, nor turn a blind eye to being performed from their own borders.
In addition, it is the state of war alone that grants the privileges that enable a state to cause destruction in another nation. In absence of this state, the privilege is not granted and therefore a state that prosecutes any warlike actions without the state of war is thus morally liable and has lost its legitimacy. This means that the state has a duty to both refrain and prevent such acts upon other states. In this case the state is judged as an individual.
The difference between safety and security, for at first glance they seem identical except in their focus and thus redundant, is thus the state of war and the collective punishment that it enables. For, if a local village was found to be harboring bandits, no one would consider it justified to shell the village. However, once there is a legitimate state of war, a nation may engage in bombardment of the foreign nation without any need to prioritize lack of collateral damage against the goal of ending the state of war. The duties are thus split because they grant very different privileges. Safety is the duty of defending the citizens from violence by its own citizens which grants the privilege holding the knife and even executing its citizens for their crimes. A police officer may pull a citizen over and administer a breathalyzer test because driving while under the influence is a critical threat to the safety of the citizens of the state, where upon administering a test for the presence of pumpkin pie is seen as a violation of a citizen's freedoms. The privilege of being able to administer a test to a driver only extends as far as the duty of safety.
On the other hand, the duty of security extends to it the privilege to wage war and enter into this state where upon the usual moral laws governing conduct are inapplicable. While normally a state may not steal, kidnap, murder, or break contracts, each of these are fully permissible and indeed in some cases mandatory, in the state of war. The exact moral bounds of the state of war, for the border between a war crime and legitimate prosecution is narrow as is seen by the American atomic bombing of Japan. But, the principle of the state of war permitting the forbidden is a known principle and is the key difference between safety and security.
The first external violation of duty is piracy, by which I mean that any actions taken which interferes with the free commerce of the ocean. A nation may close or open its borders as it chooses for the discharging of its duties, however, these privileges do not extend beyond sight of shore. For otherwise a nation could claim any stretch of waters to be its own where they can enforce their will. As the sea does not have borders or landmarks, this would quickly lead to confusion and chaos. It would only invite the war against all as nation fights nation. The sea is by its very nature without borders or barriers and is not the habitation of any man. To own it when no citizen of the state has any dwelling is contrary to the nature of possession. As Hugo Grotius says, “The sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of anyone.”
Thus, as the open seas are the collective, public, domain of mankind just as one who obstructs a public highway is guilty of banditry so too is any state that preys upon ships on the high seas guilty of piracy.
Similarly, raiding, that is making attacks upon another nation with the aim of theft or destruction is forbidden. Earlier I stated that a state is, in this case, judged as an individual. Without the state of war a state is fully liable for murder, theft, kidnapping, and willful destruction. Raiding is all of these cloaked under poor justifications. A state has a duty not to prosecute such injustices and to prevent their own lands from being used to launch said raids and terror attacks.
In reality slaving falls under the previous duties as it is either on land or sea, however, due to it being such an abhorrent act, deserves to be singled out for special treatment. A moral state has a duty to snuff out any slaving state, to not do business with them, and to destroy their ability to commit this horrible crime. For, to, without the state of war, seize people is to steal the most valuable item a person possesses, himself. And thus according to the principle of measure for measure, someone who slaves—kidnaps with intent to sell—has rendered his life forfeit.
Thus the principle that unites these three is that a state must not generate chaos and injustice outside of its own borders.
However, my retained readers no doubt have a burning question within, by what mechanism may we start a state of war because of a failure of duties?
To return to my teacher example, if a teacher fails to discharge his duties, then the authority that delegated to the teacher, the parents and the school, may withdraw this delegation. However, even in absence of a delegation, the teacher has lost the privileges and to continue to exercise them is a moral breach even in absence of an enforcer. as such the position, as children still require education, is ownerless. Just as with any ownerless object, the first that has strength and ability may come and take.
Therefore, the state can have all of its privileges and the assets become ownerless where upon it is morally permissible for anyone to come and take. Therefore, a rebellion may seize the duties, privileges and assets that have become ownerless toppling the previous state and thus discharge the duties of the state. This does not mean that anyone may use the lack of legitimacy to engage in violence or chaos, but only to seize that which is upon the ground and discharge its duties. If a person or entity does not have the ability or will to discharge the duties then he may not seize it or must seize it on behalf of someone who will. You may seize a child from an abusive home, but if you intend to abuse the child then you are a kidnapper.
The act of liberating the child from its abuse is one action and the assumption of duties is another. If an individual at the time of liberating the child is in the position to assume the duties of being a guardian of that child then the liberation is legitimate. However if for example later they became an alcoholic and thus abusive, then they have ceased to be the legitimate guardian of that child and are thus kidnappers. Historic legitimate authority does not preclude the loss of said authority because of a failure to discharge moral duties.
Now given that we have established that any individual may rise in revolt and seize authority in order to discharge the duties of the state in a proper and moral manner, the question arises as to why should it be one individual. Indeed, any organization may arise. The American Revolution is not delegitimized because it was the Second Continental Congress revolting rather than George Washington personally dueling King George III across the Delaware River. On the contrary, a non state entity such as a militia or political party has a larger claim as they already have some of the organization required to fulfill the duties of a state.
Even if it is an individual leading the charge, there will necessarily be men behind him. At the minimum these men need to be fed and armed which requires the individual to delegate these tasks. This quickly becomes an organization, where upon, it is impossible to object that given an individual can seize authority that if he has any followers suddenly his moral right has become null and void. This is silly, especially as mentioned before an organization is better able to fulfill the duties of a state.
This necessarily means that as we advance further the conclusion holds. If an organization is able to seize authority if it is willing and able to discharge the duties then an entity that is more capable of discharging these duties should assuredly be able to assume the duties and seize the authority.
Thus a state is equally able to rebel and seize authority. Afterall, if a non state entity operates as a recipient of delegated authority from the state, this would not invalidate their rebellion, again see the American Revolution where the colonies received delegated authority from parliament. This delegation, or lack thereof, is irrelevant to the ability to discharge duties and thus as a state like entity is able to seize authority our earlier conclusion follows again that a state may seize authority.
It should be noted that this seizure does not mean a transitional government. For, one would hardly expect that when the Vietnamese expelled the French to set up a transitional government to... Hand it right back to the French... If one would protest that the Vietnamese lived in that land, then we must say that this leads to the conclusion that nationality must have sovereignty. Any state that has within its border more than one nation and is not currently planning to liberate this nation and grant it a state is therefore commiting a moral error. Assumption of authority is dependent purely upon the ability to fulfill the duties inherent within the authority rather than identity, origin, or nationality. As such, there is no reason why any entity ought to create a transitory government for the express intention of handing it to another organization, entity, or individual that proved itself unable to assert power and thus not demonstrating at least the minimum ability to discharge the duties of a state.
Of course, if the entity that seized authority wishes to grant it to others it may do so. Afterall, one can put a child up for adoption. However, there is no moral mandate to do so.
Because there is no mandate to release authority once gained, we can thus infer that a state which seizes authority from a state that has been habitually remise in its duties and refused redress, the scale of which is beyond the scope of this work, may hold the territory, resources, and other privileges that are derived from the shouldered duties.
The astute reader will recognize, as a state may claim the authority that once belonged to to a failed, illegitimate state in perpetuity as long as the conqueror discharges the duties of a state, that this has justified imperialism. The astute reader is correct.
As we can see, the premises of that justifies the moral permissiveness of revolution at the same time justifies imperialism in the loosest sense. Afterall, if a rebellion were to topple a failed state and proceed to commit genocide, are they morally better than imperialists that ousted them and fulfilled the seven duties? What is more important, whether or not it is a state or non-state actor or that the duties are fulfilled. Afterall, passing a children from an abusive father to an abusive mother, aunt, uncle, or grand parent is not a moral act, while giving the child to a loving non-biological parent is.
As we have seen above, imperialism, that is one state seizing authority from another state, can indeed be not only morally permissible, but some would argue a moral duty in certain cases. Of course, this is all completely dependent upon the fulfillment of the duties of a state. A state that imperializes another, only to fail to fulfill their duties, has committed a moral crime and rendered the authority that they seize ownerless and themselves as retroactive thieves.
This all applies to rebellions equally. A rebellion that topples a state which is fulfilling its duties only to fail to fulfill its duties is equally as morally culpable as the imperial state that did the same. I suppose that the real conclusion of this essay is that a rebellion and a war of conquest are governed by the same moral framework.
Published 2026-03-24
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