We have currently explored many areas of natural law. However, we still have an entire half of law to demonstrate—positive law or decrees. There is an accusation leveled by the proponents of natural law that decrees are contrary to reason and thus not legitimate forms of law. For example, reason does not demand the issuance of driver's licenses, therefore it is like needing a license to make toast in your own toaster. In this essay I shall investigate this claim and lay out the reason why decrees are in fact necessary for the execution of the duty of justice.
We shall now return to our original case of Reuben stealing from Simon. Let us posit then that Simon drags Reuben before the court. If there was no procedure, then the case would quickly fall into chaos and shouting. The judge could not accurately judge the case. Reuben writes his complaint in French—after all, does reason demand a certain language? On the other hand, Simon decides to film his complaint and touch it up with AI. Does reason forbid a vlog for a complaint? In the court, Reuben does not bring a lawyer while Simon does. Reuben then argues that this isn't fair and reason demands fairness. Simon argues that the lawyer is his brother so it's fine because they are part of the same family. During the case, Reuben starts out by reading Simon's HOA record. Simon begins arguing.
Now, we need to continue this charade to see that something has gone very wrong. Let us strengthen this case, for one may object that the previous case was against reason. However, let us ask ourselves: does reason forbid vlogs? After all, how are they different from zooming into the court? And this is just the initial complaint. Likewise, if we were to assert that French is an absurdity, perhaps the judge spoke French—would it still be an absurdity? If so, then what reasonable heuristic could we apply? If it is just the majority language, in what region? What if the city was in Louisiana? The nation? So even in Navajo territory, they cannot conduct their justice in Navajo?
In addition, are lawyers an obstacle to reason? Why ought a person stand in between the litigants and the judge? Likewise, is having a man who is familiar with the law represent and assist the litigants such a crime against reason?
We previously have demonstrated that certain collective institutions possess their own shaleim. We may utilize the above as an example. The court as a whole possesses its own wholeness. It is obvious that the above situation is worse for the purpose of the court, which is dispensing justice, than the present state of courts. We may expand this to other similar institutions—that is, institutions which have a stated purpose. The wholeness of a corporation is clearly larger if everyone is following the same procedures. There is, however, another sort of institution that we have yet to discuss which shall enable a complete discussion of the wholeness of an entity.
One could say that a court has two duties. The first is that of justice. Justice as a duty of the state is delegated to the institution of the court. The police receive their authority not in and of themselves in a proper state, but rather at the kind permission of the courts. For example, in western nations, if the police wish to search the domain of a citizen, they must request the issuance of a warrant. Their privilege of violating the sanctity of one's home is directly due to the delegation of the courts. The second purpose, however, is the maintenance of a practice.
By practice I mean a practice in the MacIntyre sense—that is, a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve the standards of excellence within that activity. The courts not only discharge justice, but they also safeguard the practice of law. We can thus extend the negative impacts of our earlier thought experiment to that of the very practice of law. In the chaotic lack of any principles beyond those directly reasoned from nature, a lawyer or a judge who wishes to become an expert in the law is hampered. The excellence and goods internal to the practice are unreachable. As such, the duty of the institution of the courts to safeguard the wholeness of the practice of law has been compromised to the extreme. This is in direct violation of our stated mono-principle of shaleim.
Now, the exact rules of a practice are in some sense arbitrary. For example, in the practice of tennis the scoring is not linear—meaning it is not one point per score. Even though reason might dictate one point per score, tennis, through the International Tennis Federation as the institution that safeguards the practice, decided to utilize a more idiosyncratic method of keeping score. As no man will assert that the ITF has performed an injustice or gross violation of the wholeness of tennis, we can thus infer that some of the rules that safeguard the wholeness of a practice are partially arbitrary. Obviously a random scoring system that ran 7, 3, 5, 1, win would be incoherent; in contrast, the current system of keeping score for tennis does indeed add to the character of the sport.
Of course the question is then: what authority does the ITF have to issue these decrees? Because it is the institution charged with the wholeness of the practice of tennis. Any institution charged with safeguarding the wholeness of an entity may issue these decrees, for the very purpose is the wholeness, and they thus have a duty to safeguard it. Privilege flows directly from duty, and as the privilege of the decree is necessary to safeguard the shaleim of a practice—as illustrated through our law example above—it is a privilege granted to these institutions. We may highlight other examples of decrees which serve to increase the shaleim of a practice: for example, uniforms.
Despite their apparent controversy, uniforms do serve to increase the shaleim of the practice. After all, the uniform signals a unique commitment to the practice. It bestows upon it honor. Consider the practice of chess. The practice is regarded by those within it as having intrinsic value and as such worthy of honor. We may then imagine a man who, though an expert in the practice, comes to tournaments in a t-shirt and flip-flops. He is not giving proper honor to the practice, for this is casual clothing. Through the wearing of a suit, participants lend honor and gravity to the practice. In addition, uniforms serve the purpose of differentiation. A doctor dressed in the uniform of a doctor is singled out as being a member and having sufficient expertise within this practice; anyone may look at him and recognize his status and role within society. It also serves the purpose of unification. Soldiers all in uniform are better able to form bonds, as the uniform marks them not only as separate and military but also as united in purpose, as men with the duty of defending the body of the nation.
Uniforms also have another benefit. It is obvious that dress codes are essential for any society or practice. A person who walks into a chess tournament in only a t-shirt and flip-flops has clearly constituted an assault upon the wholeness and honor of the game, as well as upon society itself, by appearing in such a state of undress. There are two ways decrees may be structured to account for this. The first is the uniform, where certain clothing is mandated through an ought. The second is to utilize ought nots to ban clothing that is improper—for example, an ought-not might ban jewelry for soccer players.
However, ought-not decrees have the inherent issue of ambiguity. Imagine a school that bans tank tops. The code reads: do not wear only a tank top to school. But this lends itself to error due to the innovation of language and fashion—one could argue that spaghetti-strap tops are not within the category of "tank top," and thus, absent a resort to the vague spirit of the law, spaghetti straps will be permitted until a new code bans them. This is a common failing for all codes of law. For example, in France, two men—the Blanc brothers—bribed a telegraph operator to insert coded "errors" into the semaphore network, to be read by their compatriot. They walked free because no law was on the books to punish them. If we are going to say that the issuance of new laws, such as decrees, is morally forbidden, then this crime could never have become a crime at all. As times change, new laws must be enacted and old ones disposed of, to fit universal morality to the particular situation.
Uniforms, on the other hand, do not suffer such abuse from the drift of terms and technology. And where safety is a priority, as in our case of soccer, the more conservative option is clearly proper. When someone is told what they ought to do, an infinite range of new options may appear outside the ought, and none present an obstacle. If the school said sleeves ought to reach the elbow, the spaghetti-strap top would never have entered the equation, because it is expressed as an ought. Of course, dress codes may be expressed in terms of specific oughts rather than specific ought-nots, making them less a code and more a set of principles—the uniform being the purest expression. But we must admit, at this junction, that we have as of yet proven only the permissibility and superiority of ought-based dress principles over dress codes of specific ought-nots. Likewise, this demonstrates that continual evolution of law codes through the issuance of decrees—to better align the code with natural law and the developments of technology—is a necessity. Given that this is not an essay upon uniforms but upon decrees, we shall stop here.
We may therefore see that decrees serve to increase the shaleim of the institution and the practice that the institution guards. If this is the justification for these decrees, it would naturally follow that other decrees are permissible, such as those barring foul language or unsportsmanlike conduct. Such actions destroy the character, and thus the wholeness, of the practice. After all, if one went to a tennis tournament and found it replete with foul language, winners hurling their rackets into the crowd, and doing the Macarena upon a single point, this would destroy the wholeness of the sport. It would go from a practice focused on tennis itself—and on pushing tennis forward even while competing—to a war against all. This is by its very nature destructive to the game as a practice. Rather than focusing on the development of the practice, folks will focus on winning, meaning they will be far more willing to cheat. After all, if one's motivation is intrinsic, cheating at tennis fails to achieve the purpose, which is the practice itself. If, however, the purpose is to destroy one's opponent, cheating is productive toward that goal. As the purpose of the institution is to maintain the wholeness of the practice, it must therefore be granted the privilege of issuing relevant decrees.
Given that the issuance of these decrees is essential for the health of the practice, we have thus permitted them. However, we must bridge from the practice of justice to justice the duty. Is it essential to have decrees to discharge this duty? Given that duties often have practices, and decrees are essential for the health of a practice, the answer seems to be yes. The state, within its duties, has a practice for each. The duty of security has the military, and everyone will agree the military has practices it guards as an institution—the practice of war. Likewise, security includes the police, which have their own institutions and practices. Therefore, the state has the right of decree to preserve the wholeness of society.
Now, the astute reader will recognize that in declaring the decree, I have granted the state an enormous amount of power. The ITF controls the very clothing of its players via the privilege of decree. No doubt the libertarian, and even the liberal, is nervously wondering if they will be arrested for misplacing their shoes. I will remind the reader of what I stated previously: the privilege extends only as far as the duty. This should be written in everyone's head as they read my work, for this is the limit of tyranny. For example, in law, the power of decree means a court may demand Times New Roman for all documents submitted to it. This is within the power of decree, and I think even the libertarian would be hard-pressed to find the tyranny.
Now, there is the issue that the ITF may not enter my house and punish me for excessive celebration, nor may the MLB punish me for not wearing the uniform. This is clearly absurd—but why? If a baseball player is out of uniform, punishment is legitimate, but otherwise it isn't. Why? Because the institution is constituted for the purpose of safeguarding and increasing the shaleim of the practice. As such, the privilege of the decree only extends as far as required by the duty of wholeness. Just as a teacher only has authority over their classroom, the MLB only has authority over baseball as a formalized practice.
Likewise, if we move to the state as the institution, the practice of driving—for driving does have internal goods, as evidenced by racing as a practice focused upon driving—is regulated through decrees. Natural law does not necessarily demand that stop signs exist, or that they be of such and such a color and shape. Yet anyone who has driven where they are either absent or ignored knows that the wholeness of the practice of driving is improved by their existence. Therefore, the state, as manager of the practice of driving, may issue decrees for the benefit of driving's wholeness. If the libertarian argues that he has purchased the car and requires no permission to use it, this is an error, because he is entering into the practice of driving. All agree that if the libertarian drove the car on his own property, this would be like playing chess with one's own pieces—but since the libertarian wishes to drive on the public roads, he is entering into the practice of driving in public, which is like walking into a chess tournament and screaming that you brought your own pieces and require no ID. The public owns the roads, not the private citizen.
In the example at the top, it is clear that both Simon and Reuben have entered into the practice of justice. The courts have made decrees to maintain this practice and thus have declared the language to be English. Each of the examples of chaos is resolved through strict adherence to the decrees surrounding the practice of justice. While some of these decrees are no doubt not guaranteed by natural law, since we are currently discussing Justice, it behooves us to address some of the procedures of the court that are mandated.
One of the tenets of the western legal tradition is that of innocence until proven guilty. As a guard against tyranny, this is understandable, as it places the burden of proof upon the state—but besides pragmatism, what justification exists?
It is obvious that if one leaves a cookie in a cupboard, one expects it to remain. The state of the cookie is whole and in the cupboard, so if one opens the door, one does not expect to find no cookie. This is evidenced by the fact that everyone will be distressed and loudly demand who took the cookie. We fully expect a state to remain the same unless evidence arises that it has changed. Likewise, any man would agree that a child cannot be guilty—of what crime has he committed? And even if we invent a crime, children are not liable, because they lack sufficient faculties to comprehend the obligation. As such, a man enters adulthood fully innocent. Given that the state of innocence is possessed by all men initially, changing the state of the man clearly requires evidence—hence, innocent until proven guilty.
This principle of presumption may be extended even further. If Judah and Levi enter a court, Judah holding an object and Levi insisting that Judah had stolen it, the principle of presumption would hold that changing the state of the object requires evidence. The judge himself is a witness that Judah is the current owner—that is, he has control—of the item. As such, Levi requires positive evidence to change the state of the item from Judah's to Levi's—for example, through his initials, a witness to the theft, or a receipt. For the courts to merely accept Levi's say-so is to contravene justice.
This example points to another principle worth addressing. Within the area of legal practice known as procedure, standard of evidence is primary. While the practice of law does have areas governed by decree, standard of evidence is decidedly less so. Let us imagine a man dragged before the court and accused of murder. One man testifies that he saw it happen. No body is or can be produced—the accused burned it—and no murder weapon is admitted into evidence. The only witness permitted to be called is the one accuser. Everyone would agree that justice has been horribly perverted: by the word of only one man, with no physical evidence, another man is convicted.
It is clear, therefore, that a justice system must have an adequate standard of evidence. As scripture says, "Only by two or three shall [the accused] be condemned." In this case, the witnesses serve to authenticate each other. It is naturally difficult for two men to keep one story straight in their heads—possibly four times more difficult than for a single man. A true justice system should press this fact, authenticating details between the men separately, such as when and where the crime occurred, along with specific details of the crime. Inconsistencies in this testimony render witnesses unreliable in criminal proceedings (in this case, crimes punished via capital punishment or corporal punishment in whatever form that takes). This is because, due to the severity of the crime, the punishment lacks the same rehabilitative measures. Most everyone will admit we should err on the side of caution—after all, if we are going to exact a man's life as punishment for an alleged crime of infinite proportion, we should be certain.
A full treatment of standards of evidence delves into legal theory beyond my area of expertise. However, other areas of procedure require attention. When it comes to the administration of justice, the trial is obviously the essential event where justice is had. A trial requires a person or group of people to administrate the trial, investigate the witnesses, deliver the verdict, and—if guilt is found—sentence the accused. These roles are essential for the discharge of the duty of justice. Given that trials require procedure, there must be a man with authority—including the ability to hold someone in contempt, meaning they are flagrantly breaking procedure—to serve as arbitrator of the court.
The next role is the investigation of witnesses. In a modern western court, this role is held by lawyers, each questioning witnesses to present appropriate testimony to the court as well as to cross-examine and establish the authenticity of testimony. Of course, there must be a person or body that listens to this testimony, weighs the evidence, and decides between the litigants. The final role is sentencing. Once the guilt of the party has been determined, the actual penalty must still be determined. In the case of theft, this can include investigation into the value of the property; in the case of so-called "victimless" crimes, an investigation into the proper penalty.
In western courts, these four roles are often merged and separated depending on the case. In small claims court, for example, each litigant represents themselves, and the role of investigator is granted to the judge. Anyone who has seen the television program Judge Judy will recall that she personally questions and tears apart the testimony of litigants and witnesses—serving in the role of the lawyer. Naturally, the judge also enforces procedure, with the bailiff as her knife. In small claims court, the judge finally determines guilt or innocence and determines sentence. The four roles are thus combined into one person.
In other western courts, such as criminal courts, lawyers serve as investigators, the judge serves as administrator and sentencer, and the jury serves as decider. The exact nature of these roles often depends on the decree and the traditions of the community and society that issued them. I do, however, have my own thoughts on what is proper.
In every court I have seen, the judge or the tribunal—that is, a council of judges—serves as administrator. We may see the role of administrator in many other situations; for example, in sporting events, the referee serves as administrator. In a soccer game, the referee enforces procedure, but does not determine the ultimate victor. A better illustration of the distinction between decisor and administrator would be boxing, where judges award points while a separate referee is purely engaged in administering procedure. In a fast sporting event, having a separate referee and decisor permits each party to grant their role sufficient focus. In a slower event such as a court case, there is no reason—at least regarding the role of administrator—why the judge cannot serve as both administrator and decisor.
On the other hand, we often see the jury serving as decisor while the roles of administrator and sentencer are combined. As for who serves as decisor within justice, one generally has three options, all present in the American court system. The first and simplest is the judge—an individual, usually an expert in law and procedure, appointed or elected for the task rather than called up at random for a specific case. If there are multiple judges overseeing a case, it is called a tribunal, such as the American Supreme Court, where judges vote and the verdict is decided by majority as the will of the tribunal. Finally, the majority of courts within the western, and especially Anglo, legal tradition utilize trial by jury.
Trial by jury has an inevitable side effect. Proper investigation of witnesses greatly benefits from expertise—one must know the law, and thus what information is required to authenticate testimony. One must be able to discern gaps in testimony that must be investigated, and one must be an expert in the law. The jury, being laypeople by definition, lacks these skills. One cannot expect a layperson off the street to know that if two witnesses say 10 o'clock versus 12, this is not much of an issue, while if one says "just after lunch" and the other "just before," the difference is significant. The gap between 10 and 12, and between just before and just after, differ by orders of magnitude—one could be a mere twenty minutes while the other is two hours. Yet the expert knows that events like meals serve as memory pegs in the mind, such that a man would not know the exact time and would estimate with more or less accuracy, while every man would remember lunch. If he does not remember lunch, how can we expect him to remember the crime in enough detail to serve as a witness?
Due to this fact, the lawyer has emerged as the investigator within the court. On the side of the state, the prosecutor serves as the lawyer, while the defendant is expected to bring their own. On the surface, one could argue that this presents ambition checking ambition—each lawyer is incentivized to win their side of the case and will investigate it thoroughly. Facts that one side overlooks, intentionally or not, will be brought forward by the other. This is the entire purpose of discovery within the Anglo court system, where all evidence is on the table for both prosecution and defense.
It is thus clear that these four elements must be present, and present in a form that prevents abuse of the legal system, for justice to be had. If the role of administrator is corrupt—favoring either the defense or the prosecution—then the state has failed to discharge its duty. Similarly, even though decrees are in a sense arbitrary, this does not license total randomness. The culture of a nation and the wholeness of the practice must be considered. To damage the practice of justice is to fail in the duty of justice, which renders a state a thief of the duty of justice.
In conclusion, it is common for those who first encounter the theories of natural law to discount positive law as an irrational, tacked-on innovation. When one stands in line at the DMV, it is entirely reasonable to grumble about why the forms have to be written in black ink rather than red. Unseen is the chaos in every practice, as man does whatever he desires so long as it fits the bounds of his own reason. There is not a single practice that could stand without the bounds of positive law—naturally, this includes the practice of law itself. The exact decrees that regulate the court are subject to the purpose of the practice and the traditions of the nation, and are of course subject to review and argumentation. It isn't reasonable that France utilizes English in its legal system, but neither does reason demand English. The arbitrary decree of the state, under closer examination, yields harmony with reason and is essential for the protection of the wholeness of society.
But the practices of a society are not the only element that makes up a society. The interactions and practices of a society are largely determined by its culture. In addition, a society must have somewhere to dwell—a world of concrete and steel is not beautiful, and thus the environment is an important factor. In the next essay, I will discuss the two remaining forms of justice: cultural and environmental justice.
Published 2026-07-14
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