While we have previously established the notion of justice firmly as it relates to damage of the person and property along with theft, the duty of justice, however, remains unclear. For there are many areas that are outside of the scope of theft and torts. The natural extension of the damages to a person is that a person may be so damaged that he should die. This results in a moral quandary based upon our previous standard of restoring the shaleim—previously defined as wholeness, perfection, completeness and peace—of a man. However, in the event of murder, we are left with a quandary. As there is no man left to restore the shaleim of, our previous act of justice cannot be utilized.
We shall first examine the case of murder in depth. Simon pulls out his gun and shoots Levi in the face. Levi dies instantly. Having a wife and children, they will inherit his property. At the same time, his employer loses a great asset. Likewise, the various charities and community projects that Levi contributed time and money to lose out. We may also imagine a scenario where Levi is young and thus, while he has a wife, he has no children, and thus we may imagine the death of every child that Levi would have borne. To sum these losses of shaleim, we have the loss of Levi's life, the support of his family, his contributions to his employer, and his contributions to his community. The monetary value for the support of his family may be estimated as the amount of money he would have contributed to them. Likewise, the value of his labor and the money he would have contributed to his community.
All of these, except the loss of life, we may place a price tag upon, however large and vague. On the other hand, if I were to declare that Levi was worth even a billion dollars, the moral sense of everyone would recoil. Indeed, the infinite worth of a human life is the most commonly asserted axiom in moral philosophy. However, this need not be asserted.
Truly, this is worthy of an entire essay or even a book by itself, but as the focus is upon murder, we must be brief in our explanations.
If we were to compare two buckets, one is worth twenty dollars and the other two. The only difference is a small hole that does not mar the appearance of the bucket. This thought experiment illustrates the principle that an item's worth is based upon its utility for the intended purpose. However a purely objectively utility view of value fails to account for some transactions. A pencil is immensely common, and the utility of writing—however essential—is thus easily discharged. In contrast, a man could spend one thousand dollars on a pencil. The utilitarian value proposition is at a loss to explain this; however, if we ask the purchaser what the purpose of his acquiring the pencil was, then the answer is clear. For this pencil was the possession of his father, and his father wrote his last words using it. As such, it serves the purpose of reminding the purchaser of his father. This purpose is of this enormous value to the purchaser and thus warrants the price.
We thus have two levers. For, even though pencils can be of enormous utility, they are still cheap, for the purpose may be discharged by any pencil. On the other hand, the sentimental purpose may only be discharged by this specific pencil and thus commands a higher value in the eyes of the purchaser. This is expressed in terms of supply and demand, but I would argue that purpose is the better metric as it explains the difference in value between men. The bucket illustrates a further principle; its value is subordinate to that which it is carrying. A bucket carrying water has the value based upon the water as opposed to a bucket containing a much more valuable liquid. The bucket has a subordinate purpose, we might say. And once the purpose becomes impossible, the value granted by the purpose is destroyed.
To apply this to man, we must first ascertain the two measures that I proposed. It is clear that the purpose of a creation is primarily bestowed by the Creator, and any other purpose ought to be justified. As such, the obvious answer is to peer into scripture and ascertain what purpose is inside. For it says, "Fear G-d and guard His commandments, for this is the all of man." I have translated the ending in the more literal sense. This reading grants us the inference that King Solomon meant that the entire purpose of a man is these two purposes.
Of course, the question is, are these two purposes ultimate or dependent? If we were to ask why we are fearing the Almighty, the verse "The fear of G-d is the beginning of wisdom" might be deployed. This would thus transform the fear of G-d from an end into a means, where the end is wisdom. We have, however, merely pushed the problem backwards, which has not solved the problem, but rather relocated it. Given that an infinite regression of purpose is impossible, the chain of dependent purpose ought to terminate in one or more purposes which are the ultimate ends.
After all, the purpose of a can is for the soda, and the soda is both because it grants pleasure and because it sustains us. Pleasure and sustenance are necessary for life, and we have already determined that the all of man is in gaining wisdom and in following the commandments. We thus have a hierarchy of good, where the can's intrinsic benefit is less than that of the soda, which is less than that of the pleasure, and so on until we reach wisdom and the commandments, which have the most good. It is, of course, obvious that the ultimate good is the Almighty, as only He is perfection—shaleim—without any lack. As such, the purpose ought to terminate at the highest good, which is the Almighty. Given that the Almighty is the perfect good, and the perfect good is a desire to give the ultimate good, which is Himself, thus the ultimate purpose is to receive the presence of the Almighty within oneself, and these purposes in Ecclesiastes and Proverbs are subordinate purposes to this.
With the purpose in mind, we must also ask concerning substitutions. For given that every man has their own thoughts and personality and thus mode of serving the Almighty, we might infer that each man is thus unique in their ability to discharge the purpose. No man may substitute for another. As such, we may ascribe the infinite value of the purpose to each man. For the Almighty is infinite, and any rational fraction of infinity is still infinity. Thus, even though a man cannot reach the Almighty, each and every step that he takes towards the Almighty is of infinite worth. From here we may determine the value of a human life, which is infinite.
Therefore by a murderer destroying a human life, he destroys infinite value. No compensation may repay this irreparable loss. As any number pales in the face of infinity, the other damages that we have listed likewise are nothing in the face of the actual deed of murder. However, debt still exists, and the debt must be discharged. We thus are faced with the conclusion that only an item of infinite value may suffice to pay for the damage. The only item we have established as having infinite value is the life of the murderer. Therefore the natural conclusion is a life for a life.
Even though the life will not resurrect or restore the damage, the debt still exists and must be repaid. As it is written, "His blood cries out from the earth." That is, the natural instinct of vengeance is in some cases correct. When a debt is created, it ought to be repaid. We may illustrate this with the following case. Simon borrows one hundred dollars from Levi. Levi then goes overseas and is missing with no heirs. Even though it cannot be repaid the debt still exists. For in this case, Levi is still alive and all will agree that a debt is only canceled upon death or forgiveness. If Simon places the money in a separate account or box designated for Levi he has clearly done a noble act. Even though Levi does not receive the money, the debt has, in a sense, been discharged. Likewise in the case of the murder, a price ought to be paid. The very blood that was spilled demands compensation, which as we proved above is the infinite compensation of a life, the life of the murderer.
It ought to be the life of the murderer as well. Everyone will have the intuition that if the murderer were to hand over the life of a stranger or his son this would not repay the debt, rather, it would create a new debt. If we were to assert that the life of a man belongs to himself, this is the only life which he could use to repay. If however we assert that the life of a man belongs to the Almighty then it is clear that the Almighty is demanding the life of the one who did this act of theft and destroyed the life that the Almighty did not wish to destroy.
We may also take a more consequentialist reasoning. It is better that an action that destroys wholeness not happen at all rather than to happen and it be compensated for. As such, the punishment in some respects fulfills the duty of safety, in that knowing of the severe consequences of this action, people will be less likely to perform the action. This will be elaborated upon more when we reach the duty of safety.
Some will respond to the mandate of execution as the consequence arguing that capital punishment is wrong and while the debt must be paid, it ought to be paid through life in prison. This way, if there is some error, the man may be released. Likewise, it serves to separate those who have made it clear that they cannot live in society from society while still not taking their life. Finally, it serves the same deterrent duty that execution does. These objections while on their surface apply, in reality don’t. The life of the man is over when he is thrown in prison; the only benefit is that one may say oops, which is to cast a doubt upon the court. If the standards of proof are this lacking that we cannot with confidence execute a man, why ought we trust them to rob a man of thirty or forty years of his life? Life in prison is in this case execution where one does not trust the court. This is an admission that the court fails in its duties enough to merit this protection, whereupon one ought to replace the court with one that can discharge the duty of justice.
The second reason—that of separation from a society—denies the doctrine of rehabilitation. Ignoring the practical effectiveness of jail, to permanently separate a man from society is to say that he may never re-enter it. If a man could be rehabilitated, it is obvious that a standard such as parole hearings or the like ought to be utilized to determine if the man has been rehabilitated. Through denying such a mechanism, the potential to rejoin society is thus denied, and therefore the ability to rehabilitate the criminal.
But let us return to the issue of a mistake in discharging justice. The extreme position is to say that even if we have the minutest risk of the man being innocent, we ought not punish him as justice demands. This would result in a failure of the purpose of the state. For any murderer would know that he would be released as there is a very small chance that he may be innocent. This would quickly result in murderers multiplying until we have entered the war against all. As the purpose of the state is to avoid this, some consequence must be had for murderers. As such, we must accept some false convictions even as we seek to find a balance. Likewise, the debt still exists for a man has totally lost his shaleim. To demand this impossible standard, we would deny and repayment of shaleim which would be to hurl the principle out entirely. We thus return to our earlier objection and see that life in prison is really execution on an installment plan. A man is thrown into jail and permitted to slowly wither and die away from the view of society. He is prevented from engaging in the activities a man ought to engage in. No longer may he walk along the beach, have a family, help his community, or other such actions. He is in a sense functionally executed. However, in this case he feels his own execution. Instead of a rapid death, for forty, fifty, or even more years he feels the slow torture of a gradual physical death mirroring his social execution. Any man would see that to slowly kill a man over a week is cruelty, why is the same death over forty years not a cruelty?
This means that the state must have the authority to take a life. For the knife which it holds is that of violence, and violence will result in the seizure of a life. If one denies the ability of the state to take a life, then he denies the state and must either place this authority in another's hands or submit himself to being murdered in the war against all.
We naturally arrive at the other case of execution. For in the seven duties essay I first began with the premise that rebellion merits death. There it was asserted as the topic was about when we may rebel; however, now it must be demonstrated. For rebellion might not necessarily result in the death of a man and thus the destruction of infinite shaleim. As such, our previous reasoning concerning murder will not permit execution. Therefore, we will require a separate principle to demonstrate the consequences of rebellion under justice.
If Simon broke into Levi's house brandishing a firearm, and Levi fired first and killed Simon, there is no man that would argue that Levi is a murderer. For he was afraid for his life. By attempting to pursue Levi, Simon had rendered his own life forfeit. It is clear that one may break even a valuable pot to save a priceless gem; thus, one may break any item to save a human life. Escalating, we thus see that infinity and infinity are equal; thus, given that Simon had determined to take a life, to save a life we may take his. This is illustrated in scripture where it says, “If a thief is caught breaking in at night and is killed, his blood is upon his own head.” When a man breaks into a house at night, he is aware that the householder will be there. It is a clear sign that he would injure or kill the householder to carry off his goods. As such his blood is upon his own head—meaning as a result of his own deeds. This is the law of the pursuer.
Thus any man that pursues another to seize them or to murder them has rendered his life forfeit as he desires to destroy the infinite life of his fellow. We may likewise extend this to rape, for the man has clearly transformed the infinite woman into a tool for pleasure, thus destroying infinite value and rendering his blood upon his own head. Scripture too brings this comparison for it says, “But if a man…lay with her by force, only this man shall die…for this case is like that of a man attacking and murdering another.”
Shall it enter into your mind that this means that it is a novelty that we do not punish the woman? This is obvious. Rather, the Merciful One must be desiring to draw another comparison between rape and murder. And even if so the section of the verse, “But to the maiden you shall do nothing,” clearly establishes this principle. The final clause thus establishes a link between murder and rape. The obvious answer is as I stated above, that one may kill to prevent this evil.
We can extend this further, for if a man were placing spike strips on the highway, this would necessarily kill a man, for hitting spike strips at highway speeds will nearly always result in death. If the only way to stop the man would be to shoot him, this is clearly the law of the pursuer. As such, actions that nearly always result in death are likewise under the law of the pursuer.
As the barrier between the war against all and our peaceful society is merely the state enforcing the law of the Almighty and man via violence, it is clear that to fight against the lawful authority as an institution is to fight against the law. To fight against the law is to fight for the state of nature and the war against all. This will necessarily lead to death, and thus the man that breaks the law flagrantly and seeks to undermine the authority of the lawful judge and state is pursuing the entirety of society in an effort to return them to violence and brutality. Such a man has forfeited his life.
One may give the counterexample of a man that jaywalks flagrantly. Such a man is clearly not a pursuer; he may merely believe the law is stupid and thus ignore it. However, the state has a right to fine him, and if he ignores the fine, they may seize his property to pay for it or, in a modern state, hurl him in jail. If a man were to resist this with violence, who is to say that the police may not defend themselves? For though the jaywalking does not threaten a return, to fight against the rightful punishments, especially through violence rather than litigation, is to attack the knife of the state in rebellion. This is thus an attempt to return to the war against all. For additional details on rebellion, I direct the reader to my original essay on the topic. To briefly elaborate, he, through violent resistance of the authority and of itself rather than this authority, rejects the institution of the state entirely.
We thus may gain understanding as to many capital offenses within scripture. For a man was executed for reciting a few words and another for picking up sticks. Folks have protested that these are examples of injustice. This is not true, for both of these are flagrant rebellion.
The example of resisting arrest is the example of resisting the knife of the state. To blaspheme, which means to wish destruction upon the Holy Name, is this same principle. For a man desires that the Almighty ought to be destroyed, heaven forbid. As a man cannot take a gun to the Almighty, this is clearly the same principle. For such a man, if he could, would indeed violently resist the will of the Almighty. As the Almighty is the ultimate judge, resisting His law is to attempt to return us to the war against all. Blasphemy is thus explained as rebellion.
It should be noted that the above justifies only the formulation "may the divine strike the divine", as in, may He destroy Himself utilizing the divine name, heaven forbid. This is a clear example of rebellion, while mere insulting is not. For the criminal goes beyond atheism, one doesn’t wish for the destruction of the non-existent, to an acknowledgement of the authority of the divine. Yet one desires to destroy this authority. Which is as stated above to desire at minimum a return to the war against all, and at maximum the complete destruction of creation. As such this is verbalized a direct violent assault against the Almighty and as such merits death.
As for the second option, if a man were to proclaim against the existence of any state and then do an action which demonstrates this, it is rebellion. For example, if a man were to sign a declaration of independence, in the sense of declaring himself free from the authority of any state rather than declaring his own state, is this not a rebellion? As such, the man has forfeited his life. Likewise, the Sabbath in scripture is explicitly a memorial of creation. As the authority of the Almighty over His world is because He created it with His own time and resources, to deny this is to deny the authority of the Almighty period. By picking up those sticks a Jew signs a declaration that he has no master period. If it was done publicly, this is clearly rebellion. For when one attacks the legitimacy of the law as a concept, he attacks the law, and likewise if he attacks the enforcers he does the same—these are both rebellion and threaten to return us to the war against all.
Of course, the above are based upon the assumptions within scripture and are not intended necessarily as a policy recommendation for modern states—especially the Sabbath. The aside is to defend the enactments of scripture as rooted within reason rather than arbitrary divine decrees.
But who administers the punishment? The principle of the pursuer has the issue in that the individual may only kill when the threat is imminent. For if Simon, upon seeing Levi with his gun, turned and fled, it is clear that the threat has just passed. Levi then pursues Simon and kills him. This is clearly murder, for Simon is no longer actively pursuing Levi.
Likewise, if our jaywalker was to resist arrest but be subdued regardless, the state may not then shoot him. For the active rebellion has passed. The same does not apply to the declaration, however, as this is a change of state rather than a simple deed. We thus learn a principle that the execution of an individual only applies when the threat is active.
For if we were to assert otherwise, any man could seize the knife and execute justice. Whereupon another man would disagree and hold he was a murderer, thus liable unto death. We may see this occur in the many blood feuds that occur. Each member of the family avenges the other until both families have drowned in a river of blood. This is clearly the reassertion of the war against all. To avoid this, the state must hold the knife and therefore only the state may execute. For if Simon lynched Levi, even if Levi was guilty, Simon would have just seized the knife from the state and thus would be a rebel attempting to restore the war against all. He would be a pursuer and through his actions has rendered himself a rebel and liable to execution.
We are still left with the following problem. Levi pulls out his gun and fires at Judah. Unbeknownst to him, Levi’s gun jams and the police seize him. Levi has done a clear action that actualized his desire to murder Judah. One may argue that the end result is irrelevant to the intention. Likewise, one may argue that the intention is irrelevant to the end result. In the first case Levi is executed and in the second he is released with no consequences.
Both of these are clearly ridiculous. For as execution is due to the debt incurred, shall we execute when there is no debt? There are two deeds within a murder. The first is that of the pulling of the trigger, and then the actual death of the victim. The death of the victim creates the infinite debt, but what about the pulling of the trigger? No one was harmed, so there was no victim? This is clearly a crime of a different category which will be elaborated upon next time as we discuss victimless crimes.
Setting aside the previous case for the next essay, we have thus established that the state in order to discharge its duty of justice may, and indeed ought to execute murderers. For they have destroyed the shaleim of a man entirely without any remedy. As such the principle of proportionality demands that the state execute them—measure for measure. Likewise, the man that attempts to destroy the rule of law through his rebellion pursues every man in society and thus forfeits his life under the same principle as that of the pursuer. Thus he ought to be executed for his crime. Justice demands that in both cases the destruction or active pursuit of a man’s entire shaleim merits death.
Published 2026-06-18
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