Last week, we discussed the introduction to the Formalist Manifesto. Suffice to say it had more rhetorical than philosophical value. Really, we could spend ages merely pointing out every single use of rhetoric by Moldbug. Was it really necessary to name drop all of the books his absorbed? Probably not, however, that is not our focus, rather, we will grant him everything, noting what is granted, and examine his logic from his premises, to his conclusions.
Being libertarian, Moldbug naturally presents the foundation of Formalism as minimizing violence. This is consistent with his premise that Libertarianism is the ideal ideology. Every other issue is ancillary as compared to this-including moral decay. I would like to say that this is another premise of Libertarianism that is introduced without remark. For, violence is a moral failing which means that an increase of violence is moral decay. However, this essay is about his internal logic, as such we will presume, however ridiculous the notion, that violence is not an issue of moral decay.
Formalism, argues that we should approach this as an engineering problem. This means that any solution which reduces and eliminates violence, both organized and unorganized, should be pursued without respect to bias. This is extremely pragmatic of him, however, this is in contradiction to his earlier stated premise concerning the superiority of Libertarianism. Afterall, if I advocated for a Singaporean style state, including the gum laws, this would be in direct contradiction to Libertarian ideals. But, it would be explicitly be against the pragmatic approach that Moldbug has stated Formalism addhears to. Then again, perhaps not, afterall Moldbug does praise Dubai later. Perhaps he forgot about the blasphemy laws. At any rate, if any system which minimizes violence is acceptable then this render Libertarianism optional and thus the foundation of Formalism optional. An ideology with an optional foundation renders the entire ideology itself optional.
In this section, I will mostly agree with Moldbug. He correctly points out that while pacifism can help, and highlights Northern Ireland, it does presume the legitimacy of the 100th monkey idea and thus seems to him to be on shaky ground. All it takes is one deciding to break from the pacifistic ideals within the greater culture to reintroduce violence into a society. While missing a full reasoning, this, at least in my personal opinion, is self evident enough to flag and move on.
However, I think that Moldbug is fail to at least note the effectiveness of social pressure and environment as a form of violence. To return to Singapore, they utilize public shaming as a punishment, effectively weaponizing this. I don't think that it is 100% effective, if it were no one would publicly perform a deed which society frowns upon, but it should at least be worth mentioning as a more grounded form of the 100th monkey idea.
At first this seems obvious, violence is aggression perpetuated against someone's person or their property. However, as Moldbug correctly points out, this definition if utilized as a flat ban would lead to the school's current stance on bullying, namely, both the aggressor and the defendor are punished. This naturally leads to the absurd conclusion that Moldbug highlights of the person chasing the mugger being equally guilty of violence as the mugger. Afterall, the mugger has established his ownership through control of the wallet. Is stealing from the thief not still stealing?
As such Moldbug proposes a different definition of violence. We require a solid rule that establishes whose property everything is. Where upon violence is an attempt to break or replace the rule. A clear rule that everyone follows serves to eliminate violence.
It sounds so simple and elegant. Conflict plus uncertainty equal violence. If we remove the uncertainty then we remove the conflict. As evidence Moldbug points out that "If one army knows it will lose the war, perhaps on the advice of some infallible oracle, it has no reason to fight. Why not surrender and get it over with?" To answer his question, I will not go quietly into the night. But ignoring the presumption that no one ever fought a war that they knew they would lose, it is entirely possible for a violent war, meaning a war of illegitimate conquest and naked theft, to be fought and won. Few would hazard a guess that Germany thought they had the least claim to Dutch land, for, Germany had never owned said land. In addition, any oracle would say that Germany would not decrease their chances of winning the war in the least by invading the Dutch. As such, given that we have certainty in both, we still have violence. The math problem proposed by Moldbug thus does not follow as we have a case of certainty where this imaginary rule was violated.
Even when clarity exists we still have violence, afterall is the mugger under any delusions that the wallet is his? Did Stalin operate under some fantasy that Poland was actually his and someone had merely moved the border while he was sleeping? Do most violators of the law think that they are doing perfectly legitimate activities? The answer is clearly no, and as such, this is an unproven assumption smuggled in under the guise of clear logic. This conclusion does not flow from the premises and rather a rousean view of human nature.
As an example, the laws of speeding are eminently clear. There is no one under delusions that racing through a 65 zone at 80 is anything but breaking the law. In addition, thanks to Google Maps, the exact speed zones are likewise clear. If Moldbug was correct and mere clarity in rules leads to following the rules then we would expect speeding to be followed and the incidences of such tickets to be minimal. However according to (https://law-kc.com/articles/9-surprising-speeding-ticket-facts) we see that there are 42 million speeding tickets issued per year. As such we see that clarity does not eliminate rule breaking and no doubt without the knife of the state at our throat we would speed much more often.
We thus either have to fight against reality and argue that formalizing pacifism is the solution or we have to grant an organization a monopoly of violence to enforce the rules which leads to the collapse of the Libertarian Non Aggression Pact. Libertarians could rescue this with decentralization but as we shall see further down, Moldbug himself argues against this. Despite arguments that agreements provides the knife but the existence of the knife and the monopoly of violence still looms above Formalism.
On the other hand, as we can see in his manifesto, this is a slight overstating as Moldbug however is not stating exactly the above proposition as he includes knowledge of the outcome. Folks, not the reader I am certain, speed every day and get away with it. I would like to see the mechanism that would mean the owner of the road could possibly keep an eye on the entire road before I admit fully to this conclusion as possible theoretically. But until such an oracle is created, we must operate within the real world where total clarity of outcome is impossible. Given that Formalism requires both total clarity of the rules and the outcome, we can see that either we must assume clarity of outcome as an asserted premise, where upon one wonders what if the oracle tells me I can use violence to subvert the clear rules, or we must remove it as a pillar of Formalism where upon we return to the earlier dilemma.
Though clarity of what outcome? As in what if this magical oracle, or even the facts of the world informs me that I could overthrow the Formalist vision and establish my Theocratic Monarchal utopia. Moldbug no doubt would very much dislike this as I do horrible things like ban mixed fibers and late night television. However, given that I hold that these are moral evils and Formalism has no mechanism to remove that belief from me or anyone, I feel justified to break agreements to enact my ideal society. Then despite clarity of rules and outcome, myself and my friends will cause violence. We can certainly see this with ISIS as they thought they had such an oracle and did not care about the clear rules, for they considered those secondary to their reading of the Quran. As such, they committed an awful lot of violence. Of course one could protest that they lost, but that isn't the point, the point is they thought they had clarity. It was certainly clear that they would lose, but we must then presume, contrary to reality, that all actors are perfectly rational. All it takes is enough people thinking they have clarity or even actual clarity. Afterall if ISIS was right, and it was clear they will win, that wouldn't have stopped the violence. I certainly hope that Moldbug agrees with me that we should fight ISIS to the death should the land on our shores, clarity or no clarity.
Of course the astute reader has already been wondering what rule would immediately produce not a single edge case. I myself wonder that. Who decides the rules? Who makes them unbreakable and who is this magical oracle?
Moldbug seeks to cull answers to these questions from his list of philosophers from earlier without attribution. As such, we will have to examine these based upon their own merit.
The first assertion is that the only sensible way to have rules is via agreement. This is because of two assumed rejections, first of all divine command theory, and second of all, and this one is not marked, accessibility through reason. As an aside I am referring not to the Enlightenment Analytical Philosophical attempts such as Kant and Hume as these have largely failed, but rather to Natural Law. If we grant these assumptions we are thus left with no morality whatsoever, except for agreements. Of course we then have smuggled in a universal law. It is immoral to break agreements. This likewise must be universal as without the universality anyone may claim that according to their subjective moral code they are not bound by agreements.
Moldbug alludes to this assumption by saying that anyone who breaks agreements is a "cad". This however is a subjective description rather than a moral judgement. I really don't care to be a cad if it means I get Moldbug's wallet.
As for an enforcement mechanism, Moldbug gives the example of a wildman. If said wildman will act like a polar bear then he does not belong on the street. Crucially, "There is no absolute moral principle that says that polar bears are evil." At this point Moldbug has completely denied humans as moral agents. This contradicts the above assertion that all rules are agreements and thus breaking an agreement is morally wrong. Alternatively, failure to keep your agreement isn't a moral failing at all, whereupon we reach the conclusion that Moldbug would not say that the Nazis are evil.
Moving beyond this, the wildman is expelled from the street by society. Now, this could mean that the owner of the street expels him or society expels him. If it is only the owner of the street, then is it not possible for a wild man to be given shelter and as long as he commits his violence only on the road where the owner said he could then there is no recourse except for others to not go on this road? What if the road is the strait of Aden?
Alternatively if it is society, we must then ask by which organ does society expel him? A wildman who is rooting through trash is not likely to be swayed by public pressure. Returning to Moldbug's comparison of a human to a polar bear, he says, "I think the second kind of agreement is just your agreement with whoever owns the street." which naturally means that the owner of the street is responsible for dealing with the polar bear. But here is that nasty moral language entering into the equation. This means that we must bind by agreement anyone who owns a street into shooting any polar bears. But, what if someone does not agree? Do we force him? Again we fall into the issue that Hoppeanism also falls into. We would have to use social ostracisation but who enforces that? What if several road owners band together to form their own little nook. Either we must accept the presence of wildmen—thus losing the proposed benefits of Formalism—or we must take more extreme measures to enforce a lack of violence. Eventually a knife has to come into play, else, we fall into the issues of pacifism earlier. All it takes is one road owner to permit a Wildman to wreck havoc upon society.
This of course returns back to Moldbug's critique of pacifism. Given that as we increase the number of actors, we also proportionally decrease the chance of each actor acting in a specific way voluntarally, by increasing the number of knives, we increase the chance of one deciding that he doesn't very much like agreements and torpedoing the whole affair. Of course, this is partially answered by Moldbug himself in the next section.
Moldbug correctly points out a failure point within his system, that we would have a patchwork of roads within society. Where upon, we would require everyone every block to take a look at the rules he is agreeing with. Given that folks do not read the version of this that already exists, End User License Agreements, we would all agree that when presented with a stack of rules, we would skim and sign. As such, we would not be agreeing properly and thus it would lead to unclarity.
The example that Moldbug gives is that given disperate owners the owners themselves would have complex relationships. This is presuming that it requires such an arrangement or the like to produce complex relationships. Instead, every single relationship is complex.
For example, in my employment contract I was not granted paid days off for the intermediate days of the festival. However, this was the verbal implication that I am enjoying right now. I would then ask if they failed to provide this benefit, do we go by the verbal implication that I have already taken advantage of, or the contract as written?
We need to go to this level, instead, let us say that someone asked me if I could spare a dollar. I say yes and walk on, he protests that I owe him a dollar, and I deny. The unclarity within the language has immediately lead to conflict and perhaps violence. Afterall, I can spare a dollar—but not for him. And for him the verbal implication is clear. As such even this brief interaction was of such complexity that we had confusion generated within the first exchange. If so, then it is clear that all relationships will naturally obscure clarity. As such, we can't even suffice with agreements, we need meta agreements that regulate agreements. Therefore, as Formalisms reliance upon agreements will naturally generate complexity and confusion it will not perform its stated job of reducing violence. (Edit later)
By denying complex relationships, Moldbug naturally closes the door to decentralization and neo-feudalism as solutions. Even voluntaryists may have issue with a denial of disparate road owners to produce clarity. Without
This is, in my humble opinion, the best argued section of his manifesto. In the name of completeness I will indeed analyze this part. Social Justice as Moldbug defines it asserts, "that Earth is small and has a limited set of resources, such as cities, which we all want as much of as possible. But we can’t all have a city, or even a street, so we should share equally." Ignoring issues with this definition, he correctly highlights some important issues.
First of all, given that the stated goal is equality and that there is alot of items on Earth that are non fungible how are we supposed to determine equality? His example is apples and oranges, but his street example also works well. Let us say that we distributed all of the roads in the world. The first issue is that roads are different lengths. If I was given 14th street and you were given I-95, I would cry fowl. Now even if we equalized the length such that everyone was given the same length of road, each road is not created equal. A foot length of I-95 is more valuable than 14th street. But then, how do we appraise say I-95 vs I-160? Do we do it via monetary value or perhaps number of cars? What if someone in Iran gets I-95, that wouldn't be so valuable to him as he will never be able to come and take a look at it.
As such the quality argument that he presents, while snappy and logically sound, neglects details.
The second obstacle is that given ownership presumes the ability to transfer ownership to another and given that humans are not created equal, folks will rapidly accumulate assets in unequal measure. Afterall, in the beginning humanity all had sticks and stones, and now thousands of years later, we are much much more unequal. As such, without a knife to ensure total equality, it is impossible for such a system to stay 'socially just'. As Formalism presumes the supremacy of agreements, Moldbug is correct that this renders an equitable distribution impossible. However, it does not mean that we could not have a one time distribution than accept any inequalities afterwards. The other objections still stand even with such an idea, as such, I will not pull this thread.
Finally, social justice presumes a pie in the sky notion of reality. As in, any redistribution of goods in any fashion would necessitate violence as the person who currently has control of the item would resist. As such, the stated goal of Formalism—eliminating or reducing violence—would not be achieved.
As such, Moldbug establishes the primary thrust of formalism at an ideology, namely, that it takes his amoral view of the world and declares that to eliminate conflict we should formalize the current system of power.
At this point we see the break between Formalism and Libertarianism. While before I have been conflating them somewhat, this is because we must do what Moldbug hasn't and recognize that terms are unclear. Libertarianism can indeed mean the Rothbart and Rand Paul style Libertarianism that is currently in vogue. However, it should be noted that we also have Libertarian Socialism, Christian Libertarianism, and still others. I have no doubt that MoldBug did not intend these to be his ideal form of government that is obvious. So when I made the conflation it was not with the Libertarianism that Moldbug mentions now, rather with the form he sees as self evidence, that is the supremacy of agreements. One could sum this up by saying, "Consent determines morality." No doubt Moldbug would dislike my use of the term so I shall state it in his language, "Consent determines caddishness."
The dispute is thus, while Libertarians, at least the more extreme Rothbartian ones, desire for the dissolution of the United States as an illegitimate power, Formalism declares that as the United States has power we should not disturb this arrangement. This is as said above similar to the idea that any redistribution would result in confusion and violence. Thus the organization of the State of the US should retain its formal ownership, including its cadre of serfs.
At this point we shall continue our policy of granting premise but suffice to say that his assertion of the United States as a corporation has conflation issues. But given this, Moldbug draws a comparison. The Joint Stock corporation has a stated goal that is to grant money to its shareholders. In addition a non-profit such as the American Cancer Society likewise has a stated purpose, that is the cure cancer. Despite the failure of Microsoft to write decent software or the ACS to cure cancer, the goal remains clear.
On the other hand, what is the purpose of the United State?
To "...establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity..."
Published 2026-03-30
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